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Background
The new comprehensive Tobacco Control Bill tabled
in December 2020 contains several measures aimed
at preventing tobacco industry interference in health
policy. Such interference has long been recognised
as the key cause of weak laws and regulation
governing the sale and use of tobacco.
In this brief we summarise the findings of research
into the government’s record of regulating industry
interference in health policy. Previous attempts to
control industry influence in health policy have failed.
We also look in depth at how the Bill stands to
change things and where it can be strengthened.
Specifically, we examine the government's record in
implementing 26 recommendations outlined in the
Guidelines for Implementation to Article 5.3 of the
World Health Organization (WHO) Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), to which
Jamaica is a signatory. These recommendations aim
to protect health policy-making from tobacco industry
influence which are vital to ensuring strong health
measures that reduce tobacco consumption and
related diseases.
Our findings underline the importance of the
provisions in the current Tobacco Control Bill aimed
at combating industry interference in health policy-
making and highlight the need to strengthen them.
We propose key improvements to the Bill which will
strengthen Jamaica's efforts to stop tobacco industry
interference in health policy and ultimately promote
health. These proposals are outlined in detail in Box
1 (p.6) and Boxes 2-5 at the end of the brief.
Measures aimed at controlling industry
interference in health policy in the
Tobacco Control Bill are vital to
guaranteeing strong, evidence-based
health policies. Historically, government
efforts to implement Article 5.3 and its
Guidelines for Implementation have been
poor. On a scale of 0-26, formal compliance
with the Guidelines is currently 4.8 or 18%.
The Tobacco Control Bill represents a big
improvement on Article 5.3
implementation, but needs to be
strengthened. The Tobacco Control Bill will
increase the government's compliance to 18
or 69%. Its provisions on individual and
institutional conflicts of interest are
particularly strong. Modest, but vitally
important, changes to the Bill can increase
compliance significantly to 20 or 77%
(Boxes 1-5).
Key Guideline Recommendations have
not yet been acted on. Presently, the
Government has failed to act on several key
Guideline Recommendations which are
critical to effective health policy in Jamaica.
These include those aimed at: direct
lobbying; restricting the “revolving door”
between politics and the tobacco industry;
banning tobacco industry “corporate social
responsibility” outright; and requiring
tobacco companies to disclose evidence
of their efforts to influence Jamaican
politics. 
This last omission makes it easier for the
industry to use lower-visibility techniques,
including the use of third parties, to
influence policy.
The Tobacco Control Bill contains
several loopholes, which will allow the
industry to continue to interfere in
health-policy. In its current form, the Bill
seeks to restrict and make transparent
many of the techniques used by the
tobacco industry to influence policy.
However, as currently drafted, it will not
effectively limit tobacco industry lobbying
across all government departments and
public agencies.
Further, not all communications between
the industry and public officials will be
recorded and made publicly available,
which is critical to effective industry
monitoring. 
Key Findings
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A New Protocol for Industry-
Government Interactions. The
government can go a long way to reducing
industry influence in health policy by using
the Bill to empower the Minister for Health
to create guidelines that regulate industry-
government interactions and make them
transparent (see Box 1 below). The
protocol should apply to all public officials,
including government ministers, MPs and
their staff and civil servants.
In addition, the Bill's provisions on
interactions between the industry and
public officials should be amended to
ensure that all forms of tobacco industry
lobbying are restricted.
Tobacco Industry Transparency. As
currently drafted, the Tobacco Control Bill
does not make all interactions between
public officials and the industry fully
transparent. The Bill should be amended
to ensure that recordings and minutes of
interactions between public officials, the
industry, and those working to further its
interests are made available to the public.
Loopholes in Regulations &
Codes governing Conflicts of Interest
must be Closed. The Bill's provisions on
individual conflicts of interest should be
passed, but with amendments. These
provisions presently require public
officials to declare and divest themselves
of financial and other interests in the
tobacco industry and prohibit Ministers
and Civil Servants from being employed
by the industry. Currently, however, MPs
are exempt from these provisions. The Bill
should be amended to include them.
Prohibit Political Funding by the
Tobacco Industry and Tobacco Industry
“Corporate Social Responsibility” Our
findings underline the importance of new
rules which ban outright tobacco industry
CSR and funding of political parties,
politicians, campaigns, and candidates.
The provisions in the Bill which cover
these practices should be implemented
without amendment.
"The Bill's provisions on interactions between the industry
and public officials should be amended to ensure that all
forms of tobacco industry lobbying are restricted."
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Key Recommendations
Smoking prevalence in Jamaica remains
unnecessarily high with more than
275,000 adults (15+ years old) using
tobacco daily. Smoking prevalence among
boys and girls aged 13-15 years is
particularly high compared to other
countries in the region.[i] Tobacco
smoking is a significant risk factor for non-
communicable diseases (e.g.
cardiovascular diseases, stroke, and
cancer). Every year, more than 2,000
Jamaican’s are estimated to die from
tobacco-related diseases.
The FCTC stands to significantly reduce
tobacco-related disease and death by
accelerating the adoption worldwide of a
comprehensive package of evidence-
based policy measures aimed at reducing
tobacco consumption. 
Tobacco industry influence has long been
recognised as the key cause of weak
implementation of the Treaty. Article 5.3
of the FCTC aims to protect public health
policies in relation to tobacco control “from
commercial and other vested interests of
the tobacco industry”. As a signatory to
the FCTC, the Government has a legal
obligation to protect public health policies
regarding tobacco control from vested
interests of the tobacco industry.
In 2008, the Conference of the Parties
adopted Guidelines for Implementation of
Article 5.3. The Guidelines contain 34
specific recommendations covering
industry-government interactions, conflicts
of interests in government and parliament,
and tobacco industry transparency. The
Guidelines constitute a subsequent
agreement under Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
and, therefore, should be considered by
governments in interpreting their
obligations under Article 5.3. Full
implementation of the Guidelines arguably
represents the minimum necessary action
for governments to be compliant with the
Article.[ii]
Our research assessed the extent to
which the Government complies with 26
specific Guideline recommendations[iii]
and considered the implications of weak
implementation for continuing industry
influence in tobacco control. The findings
highlight how various weaknesses in
implementation leave the industry’s
political strategies unaffected.  These
weaknesses also give tobacco companies
opportunities to adapt their strategies to
exploit gaps in how the Guidelines have
been implemented.
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Background and Aims
We reviewed several sources of information to examine the government’s compliance
with the Guideline recommendations. These included:  Government reports to the World
Health Organization; existing tobacco control legislation; the Parliament (Integrity of
Members) Act; the Corruption (Prevention) Act; the Representation of the People Act; The
Conduct of Ministers code; the Access to Information Act; the Tobacco Control Bill. 
We evaluated the strength of Article 5.3 implementation with reference to two indicators:
the number of specific recommendations the government has acted on; and the strength
of specific measures undertaken compared to the specific recommendations. We defined
implementation in terms of formal policy instruments, which include codes of practices
applicable to public and elected officials, administrative measures, and primary and
secondary legislation.
Industry-Government Interactions
Currently, there are no rules in place governing how industry-government interactions should
take place. The only method presently available for making interactions transparent is the
Access to Information Act, which is weak and not fit for purpose. 
The Tobacco Control Bill represents a big improvement in restricting industry government
interactions and making them transparent. However, it comes up short in three respects.
First, it does not cover third parties, such as general business associations, which the
industry often use to lobby on their behalf. Second, it does not obviously apply to all parts of
government. This is important given that in the modern era tobacco companies are just as
likely to target finance and trade officials and customs agencies as they are health officials.
Third, the Bill isn't explicit about all interactions being recorded and minuted. This may deny
the public sight of off-the-record interactions between the industry and public officials.
One way of addressing these weaknesses is for the Bill to include the provision of a protocol
(see Box 1) governing how interactions between public officials and industry representatives
take effect (see also Boxes 2 and 3).
Methodology
Findings
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limit meetings (including digital meetings and conference calls) to
industry actors named in advanced in writing;
require a pre-determined agenda for all meetings (including digital
meetings and conference calls);
stipulate that interactions are recorded and minuted (and that
minutes include the method of interaction, the names of the parties
and individuals involved, the matters discussed and decisions taken,
and any follow up activity planned or anticipated);
ensure that meetings take place on government premises and that a
lawyer is present;
mandate that the public is given full and free access to all relevant
information regarding interactions, including dates, those in
attendance, and minutes; 
prohibit all side meetings, hospitality or meetings at social events.
Box 1 Recommendation: A protocol governing industry-government
interactions should be introduced with immediate effect.
Several countries have introduced protocols governing interactions
between government officials and representatives of the tobacco
industry and those working to further its interests.[i]  These aim to limit
interactions to what is necessary for public officials or agencies to
implement tobacco control measures.
The protocol should apply to all public officials, including government
ministers, MPs and their staff and civil servants. It should limit all
interactions (meetings, telephone conversations, correspondence)
between tobacco industry representatives (which includes those working
to further the interests of the industry) and all public officials to technical
matters relating to the implementation of tobacco control policy. Further,
it should:
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Partnerships and Policy Subsidies
Recommendations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the Guidelines urge governments to avoid
partnerships, non-binding agreements, and voluntary arrangements with the tobacco
industry as well as advocating that they refrain from becoming involved with or endorsing
tobacco industry youth and public education initiatives and voluntary codes.
Recommendation 3.4 urges governments to refrain from accepting assistance from
the tobacco industry in developing tobacco control policies.
Clause 9(1) of Tobacco Control Bill will effectively implement these recommendations in
full. Given the threat that partnerships and offers of assistance in policy development
pose to strong public health policies going forward, it is vital that this clause is passed
into law in its entirety.
P O L I C Y  B R I E F Y E A R  2 0 2 0
Newly appointed managing director of cigarette company Carreras (British
American Tobacco), Raoul Glynn (above),  recently promised to build on the
gains made by his predecessor in pushing back against proposed new
tobacco regulations. Glynn announced that Carreras would work with the
Government in crafting the new regulatory regime, highlighting the same
confused industry commitment to employment and opportunities for young
people.
 
" B r i t i s h  A m e r i c a n
T o b a c c o  a n d  i t s
s u b s i d i a r y  c o m p a n i e s ,
i n c l u d i n g  C a r r e r a s ,
f o c u s  o n  k e y  s t r a t e g i c
s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e
m a r k e t  t h a t  o f f e r  t h e
b e s t  p r o s p e c t s  f o r
l o n g  t e r m  g r o w t h . "
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A r t i c l e  5 . 3  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n T h e  T o b a c c o  C o n t r o l  B i l l
A r t i c l e  5 . 3  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n T h e  T o b a c c o  C o n t r o l  B i l l
Managing Individual Conflicts of Interests
E m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  T o b a c c o  I n d u s t r y
Recommenda t ion  4 .8  o f  t he
Gu ide l i nes  u rges  governmen ts  to
p roh ib i t  members  o f  gove rnmen t
bod ies ,  commi t tees  o r  adv i so ry
g roups  f rom be ing  emp loyed  by  the
tobacco  indus t r y  o r  any  en t i t y
work ing  to  fu r the r  i t s  i n te res ts .
Ex i s t i ng  i ns t rumen ts  such  as  the
Preven t ion  Cor rup t i on  Ac t  and
the  Conduc t  o f  M in i s te rs  a re
e i the r  un l i ke l y  to  app ly  to  th i s
p rov i s ion  o r  have  no  tee th .  MPs
and  Governmen t  M in i s te rs  a re
no t  cu r ren t l y  sub jec t  t o  any
e f fec t i ve  l aw  o r  regu la t i on
re levan t  to  th i s  recommenda t ion .
The  B i l l  w i l l  c l ose  th i s  l oopho le
fo r  M in i s te rs ,  bu t  no t  obv ious l y
fo r  MPs  (see  Box  4 ) .
F I n a n c i a l  I n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  T o b a c c o  I n d u s t r y
Recommenda t ion  4 .6  advoca tes
tha t  pub l i c  o f f i c i a l s  shou ld  be
requ i red  to  dec la re  and  d i ves t
themse lves  o f  d i rec t  i n te res ts  i n
the  tobacco  indus t r y
Ex is t i ng  ru les  -  such  as  the  S ta f f
Orde rs  fo r  t he  Pub l i c  Se rv i ce  ( c i v i l
se rvan ts  on l y ) ,  t he  Par l i amen t
( In teg r i t y  o f  Members )  Ac t ,  and  the
Cor rup t i on  P reven t ion  Ac t  -  a re
r idd led  w i th  excep t ions  and
unsa t i s fac to ry  fo r  seve ra l  reasons .
C lause  9 (3 ) (b )  o f  t he  B i l l  w i l l
sweep  some o f  t hese  p rob lems
as ide ,  bu t  does  no t  obv ious l y  cove r
MPs  (see  Box  4 ) .
T h e  R e v o l v i n g  D o o r
A r t i c l e  5 . 3  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n T h e  T o b a c c o  C o n t r o l  B i l l
Recommenda t ion  4 .4  advoca tes
tha t  c lea r  po l i c i es  shou ld  be
deve loped  wh ich  regu la te  the
revo lv ing  door  be tween  governmen t
and  the  tobacco  indus t r y .   
Jama ica  cu r ren t l y  has  no
regu la t i ons  i n  p lace  tha t  manage
th i s  po l i cy  r i sk  e f fec t i ve l y .
Impor tan t l y ,  t h i s  i s  no t  cove red  in
the  B i l l  w i th  the  de ta i l  r equ i red .
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A r t i c l e  5 . 3  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n T h e  T o b a c c o  C o n t r o l  B i l l
Clause  9 (3 ) (b )  p roh ib i t s  a  "pe rson
emp loyed  w i th  a  pub l i c  body"  f rom
" inves t [ i ng ]  i n  the  tobacco  indus t r y
o r  any  re la ted  ven tu res . ”  Pub l i c
bod ies  a re  re la t i ve l y  t i gh t l y  de f i ned
in  the  B i l l .  Consequen t l y ,  t he
p rov i s ion  w i l l  no t  ex tend  to  a l l
i nves tmen ts  he ld  on  beha l f  o f  pub l i c
bod ies  ( see  Box  5 ) .
Managing Institutional Conflicts of Interests 
F u n d i n g  o f  P o l i t i c i a n s  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s
Recommenda t ion  4 .11  cove rs
po l i t i ca l  f i nanc ing  and  t rans la tes  to
a  p roh ib i t i on  on  and  t ransparency
in  re la t i on  to  con t r i bu t i ons  to :
po l i t i ca l  pa r t i es ;  po l i t i c i ans ;
cand ida tes ;  campa igns .
Leg is la t i on  govern ing  po l i t i ca l
fund ing  (e .g .  The  Represen ta t i on
o f  t he  Peop le  Ac t  and  i t s
amendments  and  regu la t i ons )
does  no t  cu r ren t l y  p roh ib i t
i ndus t r y  po l i t i ca l  f und ing  o r
adequa te l y  make  i t  t r ansparen t .
The  Tobacco  Con t ro l  B i l l ' s
p roposa ls  on  sponsorsh ip  w i l l
c l ose  these  gaps  and  shou ld  be
imp lemen ted  in  fu l l .
F I n a n c i a l  I n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  T o b a c c o  I n d u s t r y
Recommenda t ion  4 .7  ca l l s  on
governmen ts  to  d i ves t  pub l i c
bod ies  o f  i nves tmen ts  i n  the
tobacco  indus t r y .  Th is  wou ld
inc lude  pens ion  schemes  fo r  pub l i c
se rvan ts .
G o v e r n m e n t  S u b s i d i e s  f o r  t h e  T o b a c c o  I n d u s t r y
A r t i c l e  5 . 3  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n T h e  T o b a c c o  C o n t r o l  B i l l
Recommenda t ions  7 .1  and  7 .3  u rge
governmen ts  to  re f ra in  f rom g i v ing
subs id ies  to  the  tobacco  indus t r y
th rough  tax  exempt ions  and  o the r
f i nanc ia l  bene f i t s .  Th i s  rep resen ts
a  poor  use  o f  pub l i c  money .   
C lause  9 (3 )  o f  t he  B i l l  l ooks  se t  t o
p roh ib i t  such  subs id ies  and  shou ld
be  imp lemen ted  in  fu l l .
Tobacco Industry Transparency
Recommendations 5.2 and 5.3 urge governments to require the tobacco industry and any
organisation working to further its interests to periodically submit information on lobbying
and other forms of political activity and for a register of tobacco industry lobbyists
(broadly defined) to be created.
Giving effect to these recommendations in the Tobacco Control Bill would represent an
excellent way of strengthening the ability of public officials, civil society, and the
Jamaican public to monitor the industry's efforts to influence Jamaican politics. We
strongly advocate that clauses 25 and 26 in the Bill - which cover the industry's disclosure
requirements - are extended to the tobacco companies' political activities.
Reducing the Political Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility
Recommendations 6.2-6.4 of the Guidelines for Implementation seek to limit the tobacco
industry’s use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to influence politics - a key purpose
of modern tobacco companies. Among other things, the recommendations seek to prevent
the industry from using CSR to gain access to public officials, build alliances with other
groups in society, and generally boost its legitimacy among the public and public officials.   
Currently, restrictions on tobacco industry CSR are woefully inadequate. However, the
Tobacco Control Bill's restrictions on tobacco industry sponsorship will effectively prohibit
tobacco companies from using CSR to influence Jamaican politics. It is vitally important
that these provisions are introduced without amendment.
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BAT Carreras Morris runs
an annual scholarship
programme, which ties





Prohibit all tobacco industry “corporate social responsibility” activities.
Ban political tobacco industry financing of Jamaican politics.
Require all public officials to declare and divest themselves of direct
interests in the tobacco industry.
Strengthen the Bill to ensure all government-industry interactions are
regulated and made transparent and introduce a formal protocol
governing these interactions (Boxes 1, 2 and 3).
Require all elected officials and all public bodies to declare and divest
themselves of direct interests in the tobacco industry (Boxes 4 and 5).
Require the tobacco industry and any organisation working to further its
interests to periodically submit information on lobbying and other forms
of political activity.
Recommendations to Protect Health
Policy from the Tobacco Industry and
those working to further its Interests
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In the Bill 
Not in the Bill
To be strengthened in the Bill 
“a person who acts on behalf of or for the benefit of a public body, the
activities of which have an effect on tobacco control, shall not, whether
in the person’s individual capacity or otherwise interact in any manner
whatsoever, with a person in the tobacco industry or any entity working to
further its interests in furtherance of a business activity, except where it is
strictly necessary so to do, in order to ensure the effective regulation of the
tobacco industry, a tobacco product or relevant product.”
Box 2 Recommendation: The Importance of Cross-Government Protection:
the Tobacco Control Bill and limitations on Interactions between Tobacco
Industry Representatives and Public Officials
Clause 8(1) of the Bill seeks to restrict the effectiveness of tobacco industry
lobbying by limiting interactions between representatives of the industry and
public officials. It states that “a person who acts on behalf of or for the benefit
of a public body which has responsibility for tobacco control" shall not interact
with a "person in the tobacco industry in furtherance of a business activity,
except where it is strictly necessary so to do.”
In the modern era, the industry lobbies officials across government
departments (including customs and excise and finance departments), primarily
to influence the taxation of tobacco products. It also uses third parties - such as
general business associations - to lobby on its behalf.
The Bill does not cover these key forms of lobbying. This is partly because of
how the "tobacco industry" is defined in clause 2 of the Bill - i.e. "tobacco
manufacturers, wholesale distributors, importers, and exporters of tobacco
products." This definition does not cover third parties. Further, only officials
acting "on behalf of" or working for "the benefit of" a "public body which has
responsibility for tobacco control" are subject to the restrictions. This may
potentially exclude persons working outside of health-related departments, with
whom the tobacco industry are keen to engage.
We propose that clause 8(1) is amended to include persons acting on behalf of
the tobacco industry and all public officials as follows:
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Box 3 Recommendation: The Importance of Cross-Government
Transparency: the Tobacco Control Bill and plans to make Interactions
between the Industry Representatives and Public Officials Transparent.
Clause 7(2) of the Bill seeks to make interactions which occur between public
officials and the industry transparent to the public. This is necessary to ensure
that Jamaican public can call out the industry when it seeks to influence health
policy.
The clause also states that “the Minister shall ensure that all records and
documents relating to the interactions and communications between the
Government and the tobacco industry be made available to the public.”
There is a risk that this provision will be interpreted narrowly, partly because of
how the tobacco industry is defined in the bill, partly because it does not
explicitly extend to all parts of government, and partly because the passage in
8(2) which notes that interactions should be "documented" does not spell out
that they should be recorded and minuted.
We propose changes in the Bill that will empower the Minister to introduce a
Protocol governing interactions between representatives of the tobacco industry
and public officials and how they are made transparent (see Box 1 above).
Alternatively, we propose that clause 8(2) is amended to specify that all
interactions shall be "transparent and recorded and minuted". Further, we
propose that clause 7(2) is amended as follows to ensure that interactions
across public bodies are made fully transparent:
“Pursuant to subsection 1(c) the Minister shall ensure that all
records and documents relating to interactions and communications between
public bodies and the tobacco industry and those working to further its
interests are made freely accessible to the public.”
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Box 4 Recommendation: The Tobacco Industry, Conflicts of Interest and
Parliamentary Representatives
MPs are not included in the Tobacco Control Bill's provisions which aim to
manage conflicts of interest in public administration.
Clause 9(3)(b) of the Bill provides that a person "employed with a public body"
shall not "invest in the tobacco industry or any related ventures". Further,
clause 10(1) of the Bill notes that a person "employed with a public body" shall
not "engage in any occupational activity, which may create a conflict of
interest". 
Neither provision covers MPs because  of how "public bodies" are defined in the
Bill - i.e.  as "a ministry or department of Government, including a statutory
body or authority, a government company, and an agency designated as an
executive agency under the Executive Agencies Act."
We propose that all conflict of interest provisions in the Bill are amended to
include persons "employed with a public body and elected representatives" and
that a definition of "elected representatives" is included in the interpretative
provisions of the Bill (clause 2) which covers all MPs and local government
elected representatives.
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Box 5 Recommendation: Tobacco Industry Divestment
Equally, the definition of "public bodies" means that the Bill is limited in the
extent to which it will facilitate tobacco industry divestment. Clause 9(3)(b) may
apply to the Minister of Finance and Planning who has ultimate responsibility for
the National Insurance Fund under the National Insurance Act, but it will not
extend to local authorities or private companies that manage public assets.
We propose that an additional clause is included which extends the prohibition
in 9(3)(b) to investment managers and others involved in the management of
public assets such as the National Insurance Board.
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